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People's China and
the Law of the Sea
In recent years the Chinese have become increasingly interested in questions
concerning the territorial sea, zones of special jurisdiction, the high seas, the
continental shelf and the deep sea-bed. The purpose of this article is to describe
their positions on a number of such issues, comment on their differences with
other states, and analyze their motivations and goals. As an emerging world
power and a country of. considerable influence already, it is important that
China's views be known, understood and considered. Hopefully, this article will
contribute to that effort.
Territorial Sea
Definition
In Paragraph 1(1) of a working paper on the sea area within the limits of
national jurisdiction (hereinafter working paper I) that was submitted to the
Second Subcommittee of the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee, the Chinese
Government defined a state's territorial sea as "a specified area of sea adjacent
to its coast or internal water including the air space over the territorial sea and
its bed and subsoil thereof, over which it exercises sovereignty."' This
description is in accord with Section I of the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone and with generally accepted usage.
Breadth
It has long been the Chinese position that the important question of the
breadth of a state's territorial sea should be decided by that state's own
government subject to the requirements of reasonableness and need.' This
*J.D., Columbia Law School (1974); member New York State Bar.
'U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC 11/L.34 (1973); also found in the Report of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 1973,
Vol. I1, 28th Sess., Supp. no. 21 (A/9021) at 71.
2
"The breadth of the territorial sea of the various countries should be decided, within reasonable
scope, in accordance with the respective needs of those countries .... Theoretically speaking, since
the international law recognizes that territorial sea should be under the sovereignty of the coastal
country, the right to enact a reasonably broad territorial sea and the method of measuring it should
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attitude was clearly enunciated by An Chih-yuan in China's maiden speech
before the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee on March 3, 19721 and was
reaffirmed by Shen Wei-liang in a presentation to that same body in Geneva on
July 19, 1973. The most recent formulation of this viewpoint was put forward in
Paragraph 1(1) of working paper I which provided that:
A coastal state is entitled to reasonably define the breadth and limits of its territorial
sea according to its geographical features and its needs of economic development and
national security and having due regard to the legitimate interests of its neighboring
countries and the convenience of international navigation, and shall give publicity
thereto.I
Since the Chinese would allow each state to set the boundaries of its own
territorial sea, they obviously do not believe there is any logic or virtue in
uniformity and reciprocity in this area. For them, it is perfectly acceptable that
some governments claim expansive jurisdiction while others are more modest in
their assertions of sovereignty. But it does appear that the Chinese would favor
certain absolute limits on the extent of the territorial sea. Paragraph 2(1) of
working paper I dealt with the creation of exclusive economic zones beyond and
adjacent to the territorial sea of coastal states. There it was stipulated that "The
outer limit of the economic zone may not, in maximum, exceed 200 nautical
miles measured from the baseline of the territorial sea." 6 By implication
therefore the territorial sea itself could not be greater than 200 nautical miles.
As to delimitation where the territorial seas of different countries would
otherwise overlap, the Chinese draft provides that coastal states in the same
region may define their own uniform limit7 and that states which are opposite or
adjacent to each other shall determine their mutual boundaries by agreement.8
naturally belong to this country. Practically speaking the breadth of the territorial sea of the various
countries of the world has always been decided by the respective countries." Fu Chu, Kuan-yu
wo-kuo ti ling-hai wen t'i (Concerning the Question of Our Country's Territorial Sea) (1959), quoted
in 1 COHEN AND CHIU, EDS., PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 472 (1974).
"'We hold that it is within each country's sovereignty to decide the scope of its rights over
territorial seas. All coastal countries are entitled to determine reasonably the limits of their
territorial seas and jurisdiction according to their geographical conditions, taking into account the
needs of their security and national economic interests and having regard for the requirement that
countries situated on the same seas shall define the boundary between their territorial seas on the
basis of equality and reciprocity." U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SR. 72 (1972); also found in 11 I.L.M. 654
(1972).
"I... all coastal states are entitled to reasonably determine the breadth of their own territorial
seas according to their own specific conditions. To put it in a concrete way, a coastal state, in
determining the breadth of its territorial sea, will consider its own geographical conditions and
the needs of safeguarding its own security, and also take into account the legitimate interests of
neighboring states and the convenience of international navigation." "Developing Countries, Small
and Medium-Sized Countries Oppose Maritime Hegemonism at U.N. Sea-Bed Meetings,"
NCNA-English, Geneva (July 19, 1973) in S.C.M.P. 73-31:66 at 69.
'Supra, note 1; 1(5) goes on to state, "The breadth and limits of the territorial sea as defined by
a coastal State are, in principle, applicable to the islands belonging to that State."
6Id.
Paragraph'1(3) provides, "Coastal States in the same region may, through consultations on an
equal footing, define a uniform breadth or a limit for the territorial sea in the region." Supra, note 1.
'Paragraph 1(4) provides, "Coastal States adjacent or opposite to each other shall define the
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The Chinese Government has voiced strong backing for those states which
have sought to extend their jurisdiction over surrounding waters. In 1957, they
came to the defense of Indonesia when that country announced its intention to
establish a 12 mile limit using straight baselines and in 1958 they expressed
similar support for Iceland's right to enlarge its territorial sea. 9
The Chinese Government has also given its wholehearted approval and
encouragement to the efforts of the Latin American states to claim broad rights.
As An Chih-yuan declared in his March 3, 1972 speech to the United Nations
Sea-Bed Committee, "We firmly support the just struggle initiated by Latin
American countries in defense of the 200 nautical-mile territorial sea rights
and their own marine resources, and resolutely oppose the maritime hegemony
and power politics of the superpowers." 10 It might just be noted however, in line
with what was said previously, that the Chinese have refrained from backing the
few extravagant assertions of a territorial sea greater than 200 nautical miles.
The Chinese Government has been alert to any attempt by the United States
or the Soviet Union to limit a state's freedom unilaterally to extend its territorial
sea as far as 200 nautical miles. They charge that the two superpowers are in
collusion to impose their will on the rest of the world 1 in order to serve their
economic 2 and military 3 interests. No opportunity to denounce the United
States and the Soviet Union is passed up and no action they might take is
boundaries between their territorial seas on the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity, equality and reciprocity." Id.
'Supra, n. 2 at 469. See: Commentator, Sovereignty over Territorial Waters and "Freedom of the
Seas. " J.M.J.P. (Dec. 28, 1957) at 5; Commentator, Do Not Permit Interference with Iceland's
Right to Decide the Scope of its Territorial Sea, J.M.J.P. (Sept. 3, 1958) at 4.
"
0Supra, note 3.
""What is most ridiculous is when a superpower says 3 nautical miles today others must not say
no; when tomorrow it, in collusion with the other superpower, says the breadth must not exceed 12
nautical miles, others have again to follow suit. By this logic, only the superpowers have the final
say, while the other one hundred and scores of countries in tFe world can only submissively obey and
let themselves be trampled upon at will. Can this be 'international law'? It is a crude violation of the
principle of state sovereignty. It is imperialist logic, pure and simple." Id.
""At the Sea-Bed Convention, a most acute struggle was unfolded in connection with the list and
the question of the exploitation of marine resources. Playing the bully and running amuck on
the seas and oceans, the one or two superpowers totally disregarded the sovereignty df other
countries. They arbitrarily insisted on restricting the limit of the territorial sea and areas under thejurisdiction of other countries, adamantly protecting the old-regime of the law of the sea which
serves the interests of imperialism." "Chen Chu's Speech at U.N. General Assembly First
Committee on Law of Sea Conference," NCNA-English, U.N. (Dec. 4, 1972) in S.C.M.P.
72-50:179.
3As Shen Wei-liang pointed out, "At the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea, the head of the
delegation of a superpower attempted to impose upon othet countries the three-nautical-mile
breadth of the territorial sea as a so-called principle of international law. But after the conference he
publicly admitted that he was opposed to a broader territorial sea not 'simply' from consideration of
international law, but 'for compelling military and commercial reasons'; because, if a broader
territorial sea was agreed on, the operations of the air and naval forces of his country would be
'seriously impeded.' "Chinese Representative Speaks at Sub-Committee of U.N. Sea-Bed
Committee," Hsinhua Weekly, no. 15 (April 9, 1973), quoted in COHEN AND CHIU, supra, note 2 at
495.
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immune to suspicion of ulterior purposes. 4 The Chinese respond to the
argument that the larger the territorial sea the smaller the open sea by saying
that, "The so-called open sea has in fact always been the 'private sea' of a few
strong naval powers"' I and that the real interests of the small and medium sized
countries lie in the exploitation of the waters off their coasts rather than in
unhindered freedom of navigation and the maximization of the area to be
subject to a proposed international r~gime.
The Chinese Claim
The Chinese Government itself claims a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles.
This was spelled out in a Declaration of September 4, 1958 which provided in
Paragraph (1) that:
The breadth of the territorial sea of the People's Republic of China shall be 12 nautical
miles. This provision applies to all the territories of the People's Republic of China,
including the Chinese mainland and its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan and its
surrounding islands, the Penghue Islands, the Tungsha Islands, the Hsisha Islands,
the Chungsha Islands, the Nansha Islands and all other islands belonging to China
which are separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas.' 6
There were a number of reasons for the timing and substance of the decision.
First, no agreement had been reached on the width of the territorial sea at the
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea at Geneva in April 1958 (to
which China had not been invited) and the Chinese apparently sensed a
movement away from the traditional 3 mile rule. Second, the Soviet Union came
out in favor of a 12 mile limit at the Conference and at that time the Russians
had a great deal of influence on their socialist colleagues.' 7 Third, there had
been public discussion of the issue in the press in late 1957 and early 1958 as the
Chinese became aware of their interests and potential in maritime affairs 8 and
became more active in world politics generally. Fourth, the most compelling
factor was the 1958 crisis over Quemoy and Matsu. The Chinese had begun
intensive shelling of the offshore islands on August 23, 1958. Secretary of State
Dulles pledged the United States to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu under
the mutual security pact with Taiwan on September 4, 1958 and the Seventh
Fleet began nighttime convoy escorts of Nationalist ships to the beleaguered
islands. ' On the same day, the Chinese issued their Declaration on the
'
4For example, the stipulation in the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the
subsoil thereof that the area within 12 nautical miles of the coast should be exempted was seen by
the Chinese as a machination "to push their views on restricting the territorial waters of a country
within 12 nautical miles." 14 P.R. 10:22 (March 5, 1971).
's"Speech by Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, at
the Plenary Meeting of the 28th Session of the U.N. General Assembly (Oct. 2, 1973)," 20 (1973).
""Declaration of Chinese Government on China's Territorial Sea," NCNA-English, Peking (Sept.
4, 1958) in S.C.M.P. no. 1849.
'
7 HsIUNG, LAW AND POLICY IN CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 103 (1971).
"Cheng Tao, Communist China and the Law of the Sea, 63 A.J.I.L. 47 at 52 (Jan. 1969).
"Supra, note 17 at 103-104.
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territorial sea which put Quemoy and Matsu within their internal waters
through use of the straight baseline method of delimitation.20 The United States
and Britain immediately rejected the new claim while support was voiced by the
Soviet Union, East Germany, Rumania and Indonesia among others.2 On
September 7, 1958 United States warships accompanied Nationalist supply
ships in daylight to a distance of three miles off Quemoy. The Chinese
responded with a serious warning.22
The Chinese have employed a number of legal arguments to justify their claim
to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles. First, they assert that a state may, in the
exercise of its sovereignty, establish its own territorial boundaries and that this
determination may not be challenged by others. Second, they conclude that
there never has been a generally accepted limit on the breadth of the territorial
sea and that each state therefore is free to act as it sees fit. Third, they say that
even if three miles was once the rule, it has now become obsolete because of new
political and technological conditions. " While each of these points may be
plausible, they were all advanced after the fact to legitimate a decision made
primarily for reasons of security. 24
The Chinese Government has chosen to use the straight baseline method of
delimiting the breadth of the territorial sea." Legal commentators as well as
officials 6 were strongly influenced by the precedent of the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case and by the military advantages of this technique. The Chinese
therefore felt it appropriate to employ the method themselves and are quite
tolerant of its use by others.
Straits
The Declaration of September 4, 1958 altered the status of Chiungchou
Strait. This strait separates Leichow Peninsula from Hainan Island and
connects the South China Sea with the Gulf of Tonkin. It is about 50 miles long
and between 9.8 and 19 miles wide. By using straight base-lines, the
Chiungchou Strait became internal waters and was specifically so designated.27
'
0Paragraph (2) provided, "China's territorial sea along the mainland and its coastal islands takes
its base line comprising straight lines connecting base points on the mainland coast and those on the
coastal islands on the outer fringe, and the water area extending 12 nautical miles outward from the
base line is China's territorial sea. The water areas inside the base line, including the Pohai Bay and
the Chiungchow Straits, are Chinese inland waters. The islands inside the base line, including the
Tungyin Island, the Kaoteng Island, the Matsu Islands, the Paichuan Islands, the Wuchiu Island,
the greater and lesser Quemoy Islands, the Tatan Island, the Erhtan Island, are islands of the
Chinese inland waters." Supra, n. 16.
I'Supra, note 18 at 53-54; supra, n. 16 at 104.
"Supra, note 18 at 54.
"Id., 54-6.
"For an examination of the strides made by the Chinese Navy in the field of coastal defense, see
Dewenter, China Afloat, 50 FoR. AFF. 738 (July 1972) at 747.
"See note 20, supra.
"E.g., Wei Wen-han and Fu Chu; see note 2, supra, at 468, 485.
"See note 20, supra.
International Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. 4
People's China and the Law of the Sea
The purpose of this change was apparently to make impossible any claim to a
right of innocent passage.28 By an Order of the State Council of the Chinese
People's Republic adopted on June 5, 1964, regulations were promulgated
governing the passage of vessels through the Strait. 9 Foreign warships are
forbidden to use the waterway. Foreign merchantmen, however, may use the
Strait if they comply with the prescribed traffic and security rules.
The Chinese have discussed the question of straits in the public press and at
the United Nations. They generally support coastal state discretion to
dominate such routes as internal waters o-r- territorial sea and to enact
appropriate controls. As readers of the People's Daily were informed, "If a
strait is entirely located within the baseline of the territorial sea of a state, it is
an internal sea of that state."3 The Chinese presumably believe that all foreign
ships could be prohibited from using such waters though of course they
themselves have allowed merchantmen to continue to pass through Chiungchou
Strait. As for straits which a coastal state has chosen to include in its territorial
sea, Shen Wei-liang told the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee meeting in
Geneva that:
Everybody understands that territorial seas are different from the high seas. Every
state in the world has the right to define the extent of its territorial seas, and that is its
sovereign right. Even if straits within the territorial seas of coastal states are often used
for international navigation, this fact does not change their status of territorial seas
into that of high seas. 3
He went on to declare that there could be innocent passage through such
waters in conformance with regulations but not free passage. In line with this
position, the Chinese have opposed all attempts to internationalize certain
straits such as the Strait of Malacca. " And they have stated explicitly in
"Though China is not a party, Article 5(2) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone provides that, "Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with
article 4 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been considered as
part of the territorial sea or of the high seas, a right of innocent passage, as provided in articles 14 to
23, shall exist in those waters." And art. 16(4) declares that, "There shall be no suspension of the
innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation
between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign
State." U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 52 (1958).
"12 LAY, CHURCHILL AND NORDQUIST, NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: DocuaMErars
549 (1973).
"J.M.J.P. (April 12, 1972) at 6.
""Chinese Representative Speaks at UN Sea-Bed Committee on Passage Through Straits,"
NCNA-English, Geneva (July 24, 1972) in S.C.M.P. 72-31:222.
3"An article in Peking Review coupled this attitude with a general attack on the Soviet Union. "In
collusion with the reactionary Sato government of Japan, the Soviet government recently raised the
absurd idea that the Strait of Malacca should be internationalized .... This conspiracy is opposed
-by the governments of Malaysia and Indonesia.... It is no accident that Soviet revisionist social
imperialism in casting a covetous eye on the Strait of Malacca, the main passage between the Indian
Ocean and the South China Sea.... Of late quite a number of Soviet warships have entered the
Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca and carried out activities which have seriously
threatened the security of all countries in that area." "Malaysia and Indonesia Oppose Soviet
Government's Conspiracy," 15 P.R. 11:20-1 (March 17, 1972).
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Paragraph 1(7) of working paper I that, "A strait lying within the territorial sea,
whether or not it is frequently used for international navigation, forms an
inseparable part of the territorial sea of the coastal State."33 While holding
strong views on the subject, the Chinese have declared their willingness to
cooperate with their colleagues on the Second Subcommittee of the United
Nations Sea-Bed Committee to achieve "a reasonable solution of the question of
navigation through straits."3
Bays
The Declaration of September 4, 1958 expressly stated that Pohai Bay (Gulf
of Chihli) is part of the internal waters of China. 3 Pohai Bay is a large body of
water which lies between the provinces of Liaoning, Hopeh and Shantung and
the Yellow Sea. It is approximately 300 miles long and 180 miles wide. The
mouth is about 45 miles across although there is a string of islands which cut
the entrance into a series of openings, the largest of which measures 22.5 miles.
The Bay is important to the security of China since it fronts on many of the
industrial centers of the country and is not far from the inland city of Peking.
The Chinese have used a variety of legal arguments to justify their claim that
Pohai Bay is internal waters. First, they state that since China claims a
territorial sea of 12 miles and since the largest opening between islands at the
entrance is 22.5 miles, the entrance is effectively closed off by territorial sea.36
Second, they assert that they are entitled to use straight base-lines to delimit the
territorial sea and that the application of this method to the coast in that area
results in Pohai Bay being internal waters. Third, they maintain that in any
event Pohai Bay is an "historic bay" and is therefore under exclusive Chinese
jurisdiction.37 Because of one or another of these arguments, there has not been
any significant protest made to this claim of the Chinese Government in regard
to Pohai Bay. It seems clear that the Bay is generally considered to be a part of
the internal waters of China.
Islands
The Declaration of September 4, 1958 specifically stated that Taiwan and
other islands belonging to China were separated from the mainland by high
seas.3" No attempt was made to use straight baselines under Paragraph (2) 39 in
33Supra, note 1.
4"'Chinese Delegate [Chuang Yen]Refutes Soviet Revisionist Delegate's Absurd Assertions at UN
Sea-Bed Committee Meeting," NCNA-English, U.N. (April 5, 1973) in S.C.M.P. 73-16:111 at 114.
"See note 20, supra.
"iCff., art. 7(4) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra, note
28, which provides, "Where the distance between the low water marks of the natural entrance points
of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn between these two low water
marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as internal waters."
"Fu Chu in COHEN AND CHIU, supra, note 2 at 482-4; supra, note 18 at 60-1.
"See supra, text at note 16
"See note 20, supra.
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order to claim the area between Taiwan and the coast as territorial sea. Rather,
the rule followed, as explained by Fu Chu, was that:
If the breadth of the strait is wider than twice the breadth of the territorial sea declared
by the coastal state, then the area outside the territorial sea should be open sea. There
are many straits belonging to this category, and the Taiwan Strait also conforms to this
situation.4 0
The Chinese coastal islands however were brought within internal waters by the
use of straight base-lines.
The Chinese are quite tolerant of claims made by archipelago states like
Indonesia' 1 which seek to encompass greater sea areas under their exclusive
jurisdiction through the liberal use of straight base-lines. In working paper I,
The Chinese delegation to the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee suggested in
Paragraph 1(6) that, "An archipelago or an island chain consisting of islands
close to each other may be taken as an integral whole in defining the limits of
the territorial sea around it.""2 It should be noted that while this provision
might be considered permissive in that it allows a state to decide for itself
whether it will adopt a method that will result in cordoning off large areas as
internal waters or territorial sea, it does impose a requirement of moderation by
referring specifically to "islands close to each other." This is very typical of the
general Chinese approach which is to accord maximum deference to sovereign
state action subject only to the tests of necessity and reasonableness.
Innocent Passage
The question of innocent passage has already been adverted to in connection
with the passage of foreign ships through straits. It is obvious that the Chinese
Government takes a severely restrictive view of this right of navigation. Article
14(1) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous implies a
right of innocent passage for both warships and merchantmen . 4 3 This provision
was strongly condemned by Shen Wei-liang in a speech to the Second
Subcommittee of the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee. 4
'°Fu Chu in COHEN AND CEHU, supra, note 2 at 486.
"See note 9, supra.
'
2Supra, note 1.
"Art. 14(1) of the Convention, supra, note 28, which appears under §11, Right of Innocent
Passage, &A. Rules applicable to All Ships, reads as follows: "Subject to the provisions of these
articles, ships of all States, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through
the territorial sea."
"'Article 14 of the aforementioned convention provides in general terms that ships of all states
shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through territorial seas. That is to say, it may be interpreted
that foreign military ships enjoy the same right. This is obviously unacceptable to many countries.
As is well known, legislations [sic] of many countries expressly provide that prior approval or notice
is imperative for foreign military ships to pass through their territorial seas. This is a matter within
the sovereignty of a coastal state-a point even admitted by the draft convention originally put
forward by the international law commission. However, the above mentioned article in the
convention has actually written off at one stroke this lawful right of coastal states." Supra, note 13.
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The Chinese position was stated in Paragraph (3) of the Declaration of
September 4, 1958:
No foreign vessels for military use and no foreign aircraft may enter the Chinese
territorial sea and the airspace above it without the permission of the Government of
the People's Republic of China. Any foreign vessel while navigating the Chinese
territorial sea must observe the relevant laws and regulations laid down by the
Government of the People's Republic of China. 45
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this pronouncement. First, the
Chinese recognize no right of innocent passage for foreign warships. Such
vessels may, however, pass through territorial seas after having first obtained
permission from the coastal state. This view is at variance with the Geneva
Convention as already noted. Second, there is no right of innocent passage for
foreign military or civil air craft in the airspace above the territorial sea. This
prohibition is in conformity with a number of international air conventions and
reflects the generally accepted opinion that aircraft pose a greater potential
threat than ships to the security of the coastal state and also that traffic control
requires advance notice and permission to proceed. Third, as to foreign
merchant ships, "the Chinese Declaration appears to assert complete discretion
to enact laws and regulations regarding the right of innocent passage, while the
Geneva Convention requires such laws and regulations to be in conformity with
its provisions and other rules of international law,''" 6 This strictness is a matter
of degree rather than of kind since any coastal state would expect ships using its
territorial sea to observe its law. In sum, it is the denial of innocent passage to
warships and the requirement of advance permission that is striking about the
Chinese position rather than the regulation of foreign merchantmen. Their
extreme cautiousness is no doubt due to a history of gunboat diplomacy and a
present sense of military insecurity.
The Chinese have recently consolidated their position on the question of
innocent passage and have expressed their views in Paragraph 1(8) of working
paper I. The new formulation declares:
A coastal State may, for the purpose of regulation of its territorial sea, enact necessary
laws and regulations and give publicity thereto. Ships and aircraft of a foreign State,
passing through the territorial sea and the air space thereabove of another State, shall
comply with the laws and regulations of the latter State.
This paragraph would seem to imply that foreign merchantmen and civil
aircraft should be able to pass through the territorial sea and airspace above
without the necessity of obtaining prior permission as long as they abide by the
rules enacted by the coastal state. The provision goes on to say, "Foreign
non-military ships enjoy innocent passage through territorial seas. Passage is
'Supra, note 16.
"Supra, note 18 at 63; see Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra,
note 28, art. 17.
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innocent when it is not prejudicial to the peace, security and good order of a
coastal state." This is unexceptionable. The paragraph concludes, "A coastal
State may, in accordance with its laws and regulations, require military ships of
foreign States to tender prior notification to, or seek prior approval from its
competent authorities before passing through its territorial sea."" This of
course is a reassertion of the Chinese position that foreign warships have no
right of innocent passage but that they may be granted permission to use the
territorial sea as an accommodation by the coastal state. In sum, there has not
been very much change in the attitudes or motivations of the Chinese
Government since their original Declaration of Sepember 4, 1958.
Scientific Research
Closely related to the issue of innocent passage is the question of scientific
research in territorial waters. The Chinese have been extremely suspicious of
oceanographic vessels and have tended to equate them with espionage and
military activities and with economic exploitation. 8 Wang Teh-chao stressed in
a speech to the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee that, "Marine scientific
research within the limits of national jurisdiction of a coastal state can only be
conducted with the approval of the coastal state beforehand, and, relevant laws
and provisions of the coastal state should be observed." 49 At the current time
the debate rages between those who favor freedom of research and those like
China, 0 Canada, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Peru and Uruguay
who would require coastal state consent. The issue is one on which the Chinese
can comfortably line up with the poor and underdeveloped against the advanced
technological states. Aside from questions of sovereignty and national esteem,
there is concern whether third world countries would benefit from explorations
conducted off their shores, even if the complex data gathered was handed over
to them. By imposing a requirement of prior consent, coastal states could exact
conditions of analysis and assessment so that they could share fully in any
advantages of the knowledge gained.5 "
:'Supra, note 1.
"In a speech before the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee on March 3, 1972, An Chih-yuan
said of the superpowers that, "Under the guise of jointly exploiting sea-bed resources, they were
sending out their so-called research ships and fishing vessels for brazen intrusion into the territorial
seas of other countries and unbridled plunder of their undersea wealth and coastal fishing
resources." Supra, n. 3. Later that month, Shen Wei-liang continued this attack on the United
States and the Soviet Union, ". . . apart from large numbers of ocean-going fishing vessels, they
have sent out what they call "research vessels" to carry out activities everywhere and are stepping up
the development of nuclear submarines and the establishment of various military installations,
using the sea-bed for arms expansion and war preparation." "Refuting Superpowers' Sophistry at
the Seabed and Ocean Floor Committee Meeting, March 24, 1972," 15 P.R. 1 3:17 (March 31, 1972).
49"Second Session of UN Sea-Bed Committee in 1973 Concludes," NCNA-English, Geneva (Aug.
24, 1973) in S.C.M.P. 73-36:170 at 173.
50U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. III/L. 42 (1973).
"See Stevenson and Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AJ.I.L. 1
(Jan. 1974) at 28-30.
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High Seas
Freedom of the High Seas
The Chinese have generally supported the doctrine of freedom of the high
seas. As the People's Daily informed its readers, "The high seas are that part of
the ocean or sea the use of which is shared by all nations. On the high seas ships
and nationals of all states are free to navigate, to fish, to hunt, and to engage in
other maritime enterprises as well as to lay submarine cables. The principle of
the freedom of the high seas has been recognized by international law and all
nations. '" '52 But there is another more recent strain of Chinese thinking on the
subject. This was vividly expressed by Shen Wei-liang in a speech to the Second
Subcommittee of the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee when he declared:
A small number of maritime powers have long dominated and run amuck on the seas
and oceans by utilizing the so-called "freedom of the high seas." The "four freedoms"
of the high seas [freedom of passage, freedom of fishing, freedom of laying and
maintaining cables and pipelines, and freedom of flying over the high seas] are, in
essence, freedoms of superpower aggression, threat and plunder against other
countries, particularly the developing countries, and freedoms of superpower
hegemony andpower i-itics.5 .3 .
Approval or disapproval of the doctrine seems to depend on its perceived utility
or disadvantage in each particular case. When the United States conducted
nuclear tests in the Pacific5 4 or proclaimed a combat zone off Vietnam,"5 the
Chinese were loud in their condemnation and invocation of the principle of
freedom of navigation on the high seas.
It is a fact that the Chinese have been expanding their maritime capability
and may eventually find useful those aspects of the freedom of the high seas they
now deplore. According to a recent article by John Dewenter, the Chinese Navy
has a strength of 150,000 officers and men and 1200 vessels. They began to
build their force with Soviet ships but now are constructing vessels of their own
design in their own shipyards. The Chinese submarine fleet is the third largest
in the world. In terms of personnel, the Navy as a whole is as large as that of
Britain and France combined or that of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea
combined. 6 Thus, the Chinese may in the future develop conflicting interests as
they attempt to reconcile their role as champion of the third world against
superpower maritime hegemony and their new status as a modest naval power
wanting maximum freedom of movement for their ships.
"Quoted in note 18, supra, at 64.
"Supra, note 13 at 496.
"Supra, note 52.
"Observer, "Johnson Administration's Act of Piracy," J.M.J.P. (May 2, 1965) at 2, quoted in
COHEN AND CHIU, note 2, supra, at 546.
"Supra, note 24 at 743, 745.
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Fishing on the High Seas
It is against this background that the Chinese submitted a rather bland
working paper on general principles for the international sea area (hereinafter
working paper II) to the Second Subcommittee of the United Nations Sea-Bed
Committee. Paragraph 1 of the document declares, "The international sea area
denotes all the sea and ocean space beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
The international sea area and its resources are, in principle, jointly owned by
the people of all countries.""7 Since the "international sea area" does not
appertain to the sea-bed and subsoil, it is somewhat unclear what "resources
are, in principle, jointly owned by the people of all countries." Presumably, this
refers to fish and other living things that move through the water. This would be
a new idea, not one contained in either the Convention on the High Seas 5 or the
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas59 or in subsequent material on the subject. Joint ownership of the wealth of
the high seas is almost certainly an impossible suggestion given present
harvesting practices and current political realities.
In fact, the Chinese do not really go that far but opt instead for comprehensive
regulation and conservation measures. As stated in Paragraph 6 of working
paper II, "Fishing in the international sea area shall be properly regulated to
prohibit indiscriminate fishing and other violations of rules and regulations for
the conservation of fishery resources." ' 60 As thus phrased, the Chinese proposal
would seem to be less a limitation on the fishing states and more a device to
protect everyone's long term interests by guaranteeing adequate stocks.
One reason for this relative conservatism on the part of the Chinese is that
they themselves have aspirations of substantially increasing their fishing
capability. Toward this end they have organized their fishermen into
communes, provided subsidies, established large markets and associated
transportation, and have begun to modernize their fleet. While they cannot now
compare with the technologically advanced fishing states, they do have the
potential need and ability to develop in this area. 6
Paragraph 6 of working paper II goes on to declare:
Pending the establishment of a unified international fishery organization, States of a
given sea area may set up a regional committee to work out appropriate rules and
regulations for the regulation of fishing and the conservation of marine living
resources in the international sea area. Fishing vessels of States of other regions may
"
T U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. II/L. 45 (1973); also found in the Report of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 1973,
Vol. III, 28th Sess., Supp. no. 21 (A/9021) at 101.
"
8U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 53 and corr. 1 (1958).
"U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 54 and add. 1 (1958).
"Supra, note 57.
"Supra, note 18 at 49-50.
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enter the said region for fishing activities provided they comply with the relevant rules
and regulations of the region.
62
The spirit of this provision is for the most part spelled out in detail in the
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, although the Geneva agreement does not apparently contemplate the
eventual creation of a "unified international fishery organization." However,
this proposed "unified international fishery organization" would appear to be
something of a paper tiger since it actually seems designed to accommodate the
competing interests of those involved in distant fishing rather than to reallocate
the wealth derived from resources "jointly owned by the people of all countries."
The whole scheme was quite obviously borrowed from the Declaration of
Principles Governing the Sea Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil
Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, adopted by the General
Assembly on December 17, 1970, which speaks of "the common heritage of
mankind" (Paragraph 1) and an "international r6gime to be established"
(Paragraph 4) .63 In sum, the Chinese move would appear to be merely a political
gesture.
Non-Prejudicial Use
The rest of working paper II is quite conventional. Paragraph 3 states that,
"Uses of the international sea area shall not prejudice the legitimate interests of
other States and the common interests of all States." 64 This provision echoes the
concluding sentence of Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas which
stipulates, "These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general
principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable
regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high
seas."'s There is some difference of emphasis, however, between the two
formulations. The Chinese draft first establishes the principle of non-prejudicial
use and then goes on to describe the rights that may be enjoyed subject to this
overriding condition. The Geneva Convention first spells out the freedoms and
then requires that they be exercised responsibly.
Navigation and Overflight
Paragraph 4 of the Chinese working paper II goes on to declare: "Subject to
the provisions of paragraph 3 above, ships and aircraft of all States have the
right of navigation and overflight in the international sea area and in the air
space thereabove, provided that they fly the flag or show the insignia of the State
"Supra, note 57.
"3G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR (1970).
"Supra, note 57.
"Supra, note 58.
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to which they belong." ' 66 By comparison, Article 2 of the Convention on the
High Seas enumerates "freedom of navigation" and "freedom to fly over the
high seas"' 67 as two of the traditional four freedoms of the high seas. In addition,
as we have seen, Article 2 contains a non-prejudicial use requirement which is
similar in effect to Paragraph 3 of the Chinese draft which is mentioned. Finally,
Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Geneva Convention treat the matter of the flag in
greater detail than this proviso in working paper II. In particular, the language
of Article 5--"Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are
entitled to fly. There must be a genuine link between the State and the
ship . . . " 68-- is at least as helpful as the Paragraph 4 condition that the flag or
insignia be that of "the State to which they belong."
Cables and Pipelines
Paragraph 5 of the Chinese draft says "Subject to the provisions of paragraph
3 above, all States have the right to lay cables and pipelines on the sea-bed of the
international sea area." 69 This is in no way different from the Convention on the
High Seas which provides for, "Freedom to lay submarine cables and
pipelines," 0 coupled with the requirement of non-prejudicial use.
Land-Locked States
Finally, Paragraph 2 of working paper II declares:
In order to have access to and from the international sea area for trade and other
peaceful purposes, land-locked States have the right to pass through the territory,
territorial sea and other waters of adjacent coastal States. Coastal States and adjacent
land-locked States shall, through consultations on the basis of equality and mutual
respect for sovereignty, conclude bilateral or regional agreements on the relevant
matters.71
Article 3 of the Convention on the High Seas mandates free access to the sea
for land-locked states and the creation of agreements with coastal states for free
transit to the sea as well as equal treatment for the ships of the land-locked
states. 7
The Chinese Position in General
There would appear to be very little divergence between the formal Chinese




"Supra, note 57.7 Supra, note 58.
"Supra, note 57.
"Supra, note 58.
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traditional four freedoms as codified in the Geneva Convention. The most
significant difference lies in the fact that the Chinese would not insure the
so-called "freedom of fishing."73 Instead, as was shown, they claim to favor the
principle of collective ownership over fish resources although their actual plan
would be more regulatory than radical. One may conclude from all this that
while the Chinese may denounce the superpowers for alleged abuses of the
doctrine of freedom of the seas, they would not really alter its components.
Zones of Special Jurisdiction
Economic Zones
The Chinese favor the creation of certain zones of special jurisdiction in the
area beyond the territorial sea. The most important of these are economic
zones, particularly for the protection of coastal state fishing. The Chinese have
argued long and forcefully that the underdeveloped countries require exclusive
rights to harvest the waters extending out some distance from their shores. As
Chen Chih-fang pointed out at a meeting of the United Nations Sea-Bed
Committee in July 1972:
Sea fish resources are an important component of the natural resources of coastal
states. And the shallow sea waters along the coasts are important places for the main
sea fishes to spawn, feed and hibernate. At present, more than 80 percent of the
world's total catch is made in the shallow sea waters, which comprise only 7.8 percent
of the total sea area on the globe.
He went on to charge:
The domination of the few distant fishing powers over the seas and their reckless
plunder of fishery resources in the shallow sea waters of other coastal states have
already caused tremendous damage and posed a serious threat to the economic
interests and state sovereignty of many coastal states, particularly those in Asia, Africa
and Latin America.74
As a result, the Chinese have placed themselves firmly by the side of those
countries which have claimed special jurisdiction over areas beyond the
territorial seas. Shen Wei-liang declared in July 1973: "The Chinese
Government has consistently supported the just struggle of the developing
countries in defense of their maritime rights and firmly supported their
reasonable proposition for an exclusive economic zone not exceeding 200
nautical miles."7 " (Note should just be taken of the 200 mile limitation and the
fact that measurement is made from the base-line of the territorial sea.) The
'
31d., art. 2.
""Chinese Representative Speaks at UN Sea-Bed Committee Meeting," NCNA-English, Geneva
(July 21, 1972) in S.C.M.P. 72-31:134.
"Supra, note 4. The Chinese also point to other sources of support, such as that given by the
Organization for African Unity to back up their own stand on the question of exclusive economic
zones. See note 15, supra, at 19.
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Chinese not only give their full backing to the underdeveloped countries but also
seek to identify with them and to assert a leadership role. As Chen Chih-fang
said in his July 1972 speech to the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee:
The Chinese people have become keenly aware through their long practice of
revolutionary struggles that the independence of a country is incomplete without
economic independence. Opposition to economic plunder and protection of national
fishery resources by the developing countries are the inalienable sovereign rights of
independent states.76
In this connection, the Chinese naturally never let pass an opportunity to
revile the United States and the Soviet Union for their opposition to the claims
made by the third world states for extended economic jurisdiction over the
waters contiguous to their territorial seas. They have violently denounced the
superpowers for hegemonism and plunder of resources77 and for deceit.78
The Chinese themselves have established a special fishing zone stretching
from the Sino-Korean border to Chekiang Province and extending out beyond
the 12 nautical mile territorial sea claimed by the Chinese Government. No
trawler fishing at all is allowed in designated areas, either by Chinese or foreign
boats." The prohibition has been respected by the Japanese in a series of
agreements concluded between the fishery associations of the two countries."
The Chinese have submitted their own proposals regarding exclusive
economic zones to the Second Subcommittee of the United Nations Sea-Bed
Committee. In Paragraph 2(1) of working paper I they declare:
A coastal state may reasonably define an exclusive economic zone (hereinafter referred
to as the economic zone) beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea in accordance with
its geographical and geological conditions, the state of its natural resources and its
needs of national economic development. The outer limit of the economic zone may
7 Supra, note 74 at 136.
""In the contemporary world, the superpowers, for the purpose of contending for hegemony over
seas and oceans and plundering the offshore resources of other countries, have tried in every way to
place unreasonable restraints on the limits of jurisdiction of other coastal states, thus causing
serious threat and injury to the security and the interests of national economy of these countries,
especially the .developing countries." Supra, note 4. "Why are the superpowers so violently opposed
to the position of the small and medium-sized countries for enlarging the territorial sea and the zone
of jurisdiction? It is not difficult to see the underlying motive if only one takes a look at the
contention between the United States and the Soviet Union for maritime hegemony in the
Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, the Pacific and the Atlantic
Ocean and their rivalry in setting up bases and plundering the fishing and sea bed resources there.
When the territorial sea and the zone of jurisdiction are enlarged, their 'private sea' over which they
act-the overlords will contract." Supra, note 15.
""The U.S. representative set forth a proposal of so-called "coastal sea-bed economic area" in an
attempt to replace the exclusive economic zone proposed by the developing countries with
continental shelf. The Soviet representative peddled the deceptive "preferential rights" for coastal
countries." Supra, note 49.
"Supra, note 18 at 65-66; note 17 at 111; LEE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 58-61
(1969).
"See JOHNSTON & CHIU, AGREEMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-67: A
CALENDAR (1968).
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not, in maximum, exceed 200 nautical miles measured from the baseline of the
territorial sea.8'
Paragraph 2(9) states:
The above provisions [which will be examined below] relating to the economic zone
shall also apply to the exclusive fishery zone as reasonably defined by a coastal State
beyond its territorial sea, except that the resources in the exclusive fishery zone are
confined to the living resources of the water column in the said fishery zone.82
Thus, the Chinese draft would accord the coastal state the choice of whether
to establish an economic zone with complete sovereignty over the living and
non-living resources of the water column, sea-bed and subsoil83 or a fishery zone
in which only exclusive rights to the living resources of the water column would
be reserved. In either case, the state creating a zone would be expected to act
reasonably, justify its claim by reference to particular conditions and needs and
limit itself to 200 nautical miles.
Working paper II goes on to provide a set of rules governing activities in the
zone. Normal navigation and overflight is allowed. The laying of cables and
pipelines would require the consent of the coastal state, Paragraph 2(4).84 Other
states could fish, mine or engage in other activities in the zone by agreement
with the coastal state, Paragraph 2(5). 85 Other states using the zone would have
to comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal state, Paragraph
2(6).86 The coastal state could enforce its laws and regulations against violators,
though it is not specified what measures would be authorized, Paragraph 2(7). 87
The boundaries between the economic zones of countries opposite or adjacent to
each other should be determined by consultations. There is no provision for
equidistance in the absence of agreement, Paragraph 2(8).88
"Supra, note 1.
82Id.
""All natural resources within the economic zone of a coastal State, including living and
non-living resources of the whole water column, sea-bed and its subsoil, are owned by the coastal
State. A coastal State exercises exclusive jurisdiction over its economic zone for the purpose of
protecting, using, exploring and exploiting the resources as described in the preceding paragraph."
Id.
"'The normal navigation and overflight on the water surface of, and in the air space above, the
economic zone by ships and aircraft of all States shall not be prejudiced. The delineation of the
course for laying cables and pipelines in the sea-bed of the economic zone is subject to the consent of
the coastal State." Id.
""Other States may engage in fishery, mining or other activities in the economic zone of a coastal
State pursuant to agreement reached with the coastal State." Id.
""A coastal State may enact necessary laws and regulations for the effective regulation of its
economic zone. Other States, in carrying out any activities in the economic zone of a coastal State,
are required to observe the relevant laws and regulations of the coastal State." Id.
""A coastal State is entitled, when necessary, to deal with unauthorized fishery, mining or other
activities in its economic zone and with violations of its relevant laws and regulations even though
permission for such activities has been given." Id.
""The delimitation of boundaries between the economic zones of coastal States adjacent or
opposite to each other shall be jointly determined through consultation on an equal footing. Coastal
States adjacent or oppposite to each other shall, on the basis of safeguarding and respecting the
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Finally, the Chinese do have an interesting proposal regarding the rights of
others in a coastal state's economic zone. Paragraph 2(3) of working paper I
suggests:
A coastal State shall, in principle, grant to the land-locked and shelf-locked States
adjacent to its territory common enjoyment of a certain proportion of the rights of
ownership in its economic zone. The coastal State and its adjacent land-locked and
shelf-locked States shall, through consultations on the basis of equality and mutual
respect for sovereignty, conclude bilateral or regional agreements on the relevant
matters. 89
The concrete effect of the adoption of this proposal is obvious. The distant
fish and other wealth harvesting powers could be banned from the rich
economic zones of the rest of the world. On the other hand, the land-locked and
shelf-locked countries, which have certainly not been voracious plunderers of
ocean wealth, would be given special rights in those economic zones. Thus, the
Chinese plan would tend to accomplish a conservation goal by giving the coastal
states the right to manage the waters up to 200 miles off their shores. And it
would definitely accomplish the political objective of restraining and isolating
the advanced technological powers.
Security Zones
Another exercise of special jurisdiction in the area beyond the territorial sea is
the security zone. The original Chinese view of this concept was framed by Fu
Chu, "In order to meet the needs of national defense and security, the coastal
state can delimit a particular area within its own territorial sea as a prohibited
zone, refusing passage through it to all vessels .... 9o In other words, it is a part
of the territorial sea in which there is not a right of innocent passage even for
merchantmen. In practice however the Chinese have designated three areas
which are apparently on the high seas beyond their 12-mile territorial limit as
security zones (under differing names) in which foreign ships are either
completely banned, required to request permission, or advised to avoid. 91 The
factor which distinguishes their zones from that established by the Americans
off Vietnam which drew so much protest 92 is that the Chinese areas are
contiguous to the state's territorial seas and are designed for defense of the
homeland rather than protection of a faraway military operation. Still, there is a
real question whether their security zones are an infringement of the doctrine of
the freedom of the high seas as the Chinese themselves have interpreted it.
sovereignty of each other, conduct necessary consultations to work out reasonable solutions for the
exploitation, regulation and other matters relating to the natural resources in the contiguous parts
of their economic zones." Id.
a9d.
"Fu Chu in COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 2 at 533.
"Note 18, supra, at 64-65; note 17, supra, at 113-114.
"See note 55, supra.
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Peace Zones
Closely related to security zones are so-called "zones of peace," which are
areas that would be free of all military activity by outside powers. While no such
areas have yet been established in fact, there were efforts made in the United
Nations to designate the Indian Ocean as a zone of Peace. The most recent
resolution to this effect was passed by the General Assembly in 1971. The
Chinese Government expressed strong support for the proposal. In truth, they
felt it coincided with their political interest of supporting Pakistan in its
confrontation with India.93 However, nothing has come of the idea. 4
Pollution Zones
The Chinese Government also supports the notion that a coastal state is
entitled to assert limited jurisdiction over a portion of the high seas beyond
territorial waters for the purpose of dealing with pollution. As Chen Chih-fang
declared to the Second Subcommittee of the United Nations Sea-Bed
Committee on August 2, 1973:
We think that coastal states, being the direct victims of marine pollution, have the full
right as well as necessity to exercise direct jurisdiction and control over areas within
given limits, which are adjacent to their territorial seas, in order to protect the health
and security of their people and meet the needs of their economic development. "
The key unanswered question of course is just how far this zone should
extend. The Chinese have not yet given substance to the controlling phrase
"within given limits."
Customs Zones
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Chinese approve of the creation of
special customs zones for the enforcement of trading regulations. 96
""In his speech to the First Committee of the General Assembly, "Chen Chu pointed out that at
present the peace in the Indian Ocean is being seriously undermined. With the abetment and
support of the Soviet Union, India has launched a large scale armed aggression against Pakistan.
Such flagrant acts of aggression must be severely condemned. He pointed out that India is
hypocritically assuming "peace-loving" gestures and it is essential to tear away India's mask. He
further pointed out that the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and India must undertake
obligations." "Chen Chu Expounds China's Principled Stand in Supporting 'Declaration of Indian
Ocean as Peace Zone,' " NCNA-English, UN (Dec. 10, 1971) in S.C.M.P. 71-51:116.
04fhe following year, Chen Chu again spoke on the subject. "As a result of the Indian aggression
against Pakistan last year with the support of the Soviet Union and the continued non-implementa-
tion of the relevant resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council, the
South-Asian sub-continent is not tranquil either. One superpower takes the Indian Ocean as its
important strategic base, where its fleet is plying hither and thither with no intention to quit. The
other superpower, following the steps of the former, has in recent years actively carried out military
expansion and established military bases in the Indian Ocean zone in contention for spheres of
influence." "Chen Chu Supports Just Proposal of Declaring Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace,"
NCNA-English, UN (Dec. 5, 1972) in S.C.M.P. 72-50:184 at 184-5.
""On Prevention and Control of Marine Pollution," 1S P.R. 34:12 (Aug. 25, 1972).
"Note 18, supra, at 67.
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Continental Shelf
General Principles
The Chinese Government expressed its general attitude on the matter of the
continental shelf when An Chi-yuan delivered his first speech to the United
Nations Sea-Bed Committee on March 3, 1972: "We maintain that all coastal
countries have the right of disposal of their natural resources in their coastal
seas, sea-bed, and the subsoil thereof so as to promote the well-being of their
people and the development of their national economic interests."
' 97
Breadth
The Chinese went on to elaborate their position on the continental shelf in
working paper I submitted to the Second Subcommittee of the United Nations
Sea-Bed Committee in 1973. Paragraph 3(1) provides that:
By virtue of the principle that the continental shelf is the natural prolongation of the
continental territory, a coastal state may reasonably define, according to its specific
geographical conditions, the limits of the continental shelf under its exclusive
jurisdiction beyond its territorial sea or economic zone. The maximum limits of such
continental shelf may be determined among States through consultations. 98
As usual, the Chinese would allow a coastal state to exercise its sovereign
discretion in setting reasonable limits on its continental shelf. They recognize
that some maximum limits are necessary and imply that they may be greater
than the 200 nautical mile extension of the territorial sea or economic zone.
However, they do not say how these maximum limits are to be determined,
whether by distance from shore or by a rule of exploitability, 99 and suggest only
that there be discussions to arrive at a solution.
Ownership of Resources
The Chinese draft goes on to say in Paragraph 3(2) that "The natural
resources of the continental shelf, including the mineral resources of the sea-bed
and subsoil and the living resources of sedentary species, appertain to the
coastal State." 100 This description of the resources at issue is congruent with
-"Supra, note 3.
"Supra, note 1.
"Cf., Art. 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf on April 26, 1958. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
13/L. 55 (1955). "For the purpose of these articles, the term 'continental shelf' is used as referring (a)
to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the
territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and
subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands."
0 Supra, note 1.
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that contained in the Convention on the Continental Shelf10 1 and with common
usage.
Navigation and Overflight
Paragraph 3(3) of working paper I states that:
The superjacent waters of the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea, the economic
zone or the fishery zone are not subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal State. The
normal navigation and overflight on the superjacent waters of the continental shelf
and in the air space thereabove by ships and aircraft of ail states shall not be
prejudiced. 102
Again, this is very similar to the corresponding provision of the Geneva
Convention"0 3 and is generally agreed upon.
Cables and Pipelines
The next provision of the Chinese draft differs somewhat in emphasis from
the Geneva Convention. Paragraph 3(4) declares: "A coastal State may enact all
necessary laws and regulations for the effective management of its continental
shelf. The delineation of the course for laying submarine cables and pipelines on
the continental shelf by a foreign state is subject to the consent of the coastal
State. '0 This seems to grant the coastal state absolute discretion about whether
to allow others to lay cables or pipelines. At the very least, it gives the coastal
state the right to decide where such cables and pipelines are to run. The Geneva
Convention, on the other hand, accentuates non-interference by the coastal
state in such activities. Article 4 provides: "Subject to its right to take
reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental shelf and the
exploitation of its natural resources, the coastal state may not impede the laying
or maintenance of submarine cables or pipelines on the continental shelf."' 105
Thus, whereas the Chinese proposal emphasizes the rights of the coastal state,
the Geneva Convention emphasizes the rights of others.
Shelf Boundaries
The Chinese draft concludes its exposition of the principles that ought to
govern the continental shelf by stipulating that states whose continental shelves
'Art. 2(1) declares, "The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources." And Article 2(4) goes on to say, "The
natural resources referred to in these articles consist of the mineral and non-living resources of the
sea-bed and subsoil together with the living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say,
organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the sea-bed or are unable
to move except in constant physical contact with the sea-bed or the subsoil." Supra, note 99.
0 Supra, note 1.
" Art. 3 reads, "The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal
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are opposite or adjacent and connect together should delimit their respective
jurisdictions by agreement. 6 The Geneva Convention also calls on states to
settle their boundaries by negotiation but provides that in the absence of
agreement or special circumstances, the rule of equidistance will apply. 07
The Chinese Claim
The Chinese themselves have asserted sovereign rights over the continental
shelf but have never actually defined the limits of their claim. They do however
vigorously condemn what they consider to be intrusions upon their continental
shelf by the Japanese and Koreans in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.
The issue is complicated by the unsettled legal status of Taiwan and various
small islands of disputed ownership. In a Jen-min Jih-pao article appearing on
December 29, 1970, Commentator noted that "the Japanese reactionaries,
ganging up with the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang and the Pak Jung Hi clique,
are stepping up their scheme to plunder, together with U.S. imperialism, the
sea-bed and subsoil resources to China and Korea."' 0 8 After denouncing the
joint development plans undertaken by Japan, Korea and Taiwan, he declared:
Taiwan Province and the islands appertaining thereto, including the Tiaoyu,
Huangwei, Chihwei, Nanhsiao, Peihsiao and other islands, are China's sacred
territories. The resources of the sea-bed and subsoil of the seas around these islands
and of the shallow seas adjacent to other parts of China all belong to China, their
owner, and we will never permit others to lay their hands on them. 0 9
He then went on to warn those dealing with the Taiwan Government:
All agreements and contracts concerning the exploration and exploitation of China's
sea-bed and subsoil resources that gang concluded with any country, any
international organization or any foreign public or private enterprise under the
signboard of "joint development" or anything else are illegal and null and void. 110
'
06Art. 3(5) says, "States adjacent or opposite to each other, the continental shelves of which
connect together, shall jointly determine the delimitation of the limits of jurisdiction of the
continental shelves through consultations on an equal footing." Article 3(6) goes on to declare,
"States adjacent or opposite to each other, the continental shelves of which connect together shall,
on the basis of safeguarding and respecting the sovereignty ot each other, conduct necessary
consultations to work out reasonable solutions for the exploitation, regulation and other matters
relating to the natural resources in their contiguous parts of the continental shelves." Supra, note
99.
10in both art. 6(1), which deals with adjacent continental shelves, and art. 6(2) which deals with
opposite continental shelves, there is language to the effect that in the absence of agreement and
unless special circumstances prevail, the boundary line is to be determined by resort to the principle
of equidistarice. Supra, note 99.
' Commentator, "On China's Seabed and Subsoil Resources," J.MJ.P. (Dec. 29, 1970) quoted in
CHAI, ED., THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 324-5 (1972).
107d., 325.
"'Id.; see also, Commentator, "China's Territory and Sovereignty Brook No Encroachment,"
NCNA-English, Peking (May 1, 1971) in S.C.M.P. 71-19:159.
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The Chinese have since reaffirmed that position in the United Nations."'
Thus, it appears that the Chinese are not exercised because the Japanese or
Koreans have made any claims which encroach upon the shelf near the China
mainland. Instead, they are angry that joint development agreements have been
concluded with the Nationalists which they feel give away their rights to the shelf
around the Chinese province of Taiwan without permission of the sole legitimate
Government in Peking.
The lively Chinese interest in the continental shelf is due to the fact that the
exploratory reports indicate the possibility of large oil reserves in the subsoil
beneath the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea." 2 While China is self-sufficient
in oil at the present time, it views the prospect of off-shore wells as a potential
income producer and source of fuel for an expanding economy.
The reason that the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands are so important is that ownership of
the group will have a significant effect on the delimitation of the continental
shelf with Japan and the consequent division of the wealth. The Chinese (and
the Nationalist Government on Taiwan) advance a number of arguments in
support of their assertion of sovereignty. First, they point, out that geologically
the islands are situated on the continental shelf which is contiguous to the China
mainland and Taiwan whereas they are separated from the Ryukyus by the
Okinawa Trough which is more than 2000 meters deep. Second, although the
islands are uninhabited, they have traditionally been used by Chinese
fishermen. Third, the earliest writings which mention the islands refer to them
as part of China rather than the Ryukyus. Fourth, the Chinese reason that when
Taiwan and the smaller islands associated with it were ceded to Japan as a result
of the 1895 treaty ending the Sino-Japanese War, the Tiao-yu-t'ai chain was also
transferred. Therefore, when Japan surrendered to the Allies in 1945 and
agreed to the return of all Chinese territories, this included the Tiao-yu-t'ai
Islands."'
It is obvious that there cannot be a final determination of the continental
shelf boundary in the areas of the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea until the
status of Taiwan is settled and the ownership of the Tiao-yu-t'ai and other
groups is resolved. But until those political issues are negotiated, the Chinese
I In his speech before the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee on March 3, 1972, An Chin-yuan
used very similar language in stating:
China's Taiwan Province and all the islands appertaining to it, including Tiaoyu Island,
Huangwei Island, Chihwei Island, Nanhsiao Island, Peihsiao Island, etc. are part of China's
sacred territory. The sea-bed resources of the seas around these islands and of the shallow seas
adjacent to other parts of China belong completely to China and it is absolutely impermissible for
any foreign aggressor to poke his fingers into them. No one whosoever is allowed to create any
pretext to carve off China's territory and plunder the sea resources belonging to China. And no
one will ever succeed in doing so. Supra, note 3.
"
2See generally Choon-Ho Park, Oil Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed
Controversy. 14 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 212 (1973).
131d. at 253.
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can be expected to do everything necessary to preserve their claims and to work
for acceptance of the principles formulated in working paper I.
Sea-Bed
International Rigime
The Chinese position on the sea-bed is dictated by a belief that its resources
are "commonly owned by all the peoples in the world"114 and that domination
by the superpowers must be relentlessly opposed. In working paper II,
Paragraph 7 provides that "The exploration, exploitation and all other activities
conducted in the sea-bed, ocean floor and the subsoil of the international sea
area shall be governed by the international r6gime and the international
machinery to be established." 1 5 They of course assert that this international
regime mugt be especially responsive to the interests of the developing
countries. "I
General Assembly Declaration of Principles
Governing the Sea-Bed
While the foregoing propositions are in accord with General Assembly
Resolution 2749 (XXV) adopted on December 17, 1970, there are a number of
matters which the Chinese want to be made more explicit. First, the Declaration
does not specify what resources are to be covered by the international regime.
The Chinese believe it is appropriate to include living resources in the scope of
its control. 1 7 Second, the competence of the international regime as set out in
the Declaration appears limited to governing the exploration and exploitation of
the sea-bed. The Chinese, however, wish to maximize the role of the
international r6gime in order better to serve the needs of the developing
countries and curtail the activities of the superpowers. '1 8 But they have not
actually specified what additional areas should be involved. Third, while the
Declaration enumerates three ways in which the "States shall promote
international co-operation in scientific research exclusively for peaceful
purposes, 11 9 the Chinese argue that:
I ISupra, note 3. Cf. Declaration of Principles, supra note 63, 1, "The sea-bed and ocean floor,
and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the
area), as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind."
'Supra, note 57. Cf., Declaration of Principles, supra note 63, 4, "All activities regarding the
exploration and exploitation of the resources of the area and other related activities shall be
governed by the international regime to be established."
I 6Supra, note 49 at 173. Cf., Declaration of Principles, supra note 63, 7, "The exploration of the
area and the exploitation of its resources shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole,
irrespective of the. geographical location of States, whether landlocked or coastal, and taking into
particular consideration- the interests and needs of the developing countries." See also 9, id.
1
7
"Chinese Representative [Hsia Pu] to UN Sea-Bed Committee Speaks at Sub-Committee
Meeting," NCNA-English, Geneva (July 27, 1972) in S.C.M.P. 72-32:85 at 86.
"'Id. at 86-7.
"'Supra, note 63, 10.
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Marine scientific research in the international seas should be conducted under the
control of the relevant international systems and machinery. Such control is not for
obstructing marine scientific research or restricting scientific activities, but for
preventing a handful of hegemonic powers from dominating marine scientific
research, and for preventing the superpowers from unlawfully occupying international
sea-bed area and resources. 120
In other words, they would vest responsibility for the conduct of deep sea
research in the international organization that would be set up rather than in
the states in order to prevent domination by the technologically advanced
superpowers. Whether this would be accomplished through mixed crews or
some type of contractual arrangement is not spelled out.
There is one issue on which the Chinese are in frank disagreement with the
General Assembly resolution. They believe that the effect of Paragraph 8 of the
Declaration which mandates peaceful use and the exclusion of nuclear weapons
from the sea-bed"' is to protect and perpetuate the military advantage of the
United States and the Soviet Union. As Hsia Pu argued before the Second
Subcommittee of the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee:
Some people have proposed to include the question of the prohibition of nuclear tests
and the emplacement of nuclear weapons in the sea-bed area into the international
rdgime... to advocate prohibition of nuclear tests in the international sea-bed is in
effect designed to enable the two superpowers to continue monopolizing nuclear
weapons, control other countries and tie the hands of peace-loving countries. 122
He did go on to state, however, that if nuclear powered submarines
(presumably missile carrying) were banned from the high seas and the territorial
seas of other countries, then the Chinese would support the prohibition on the
emplacement of nuclear and other weapons from the deep sea-bed and the
continental shelf areas under national jurisdiction.
Commercial Exploitation
China was one of the sponsors of a resolution submitted to the United Nations
Sea-Bed Committee which reaffirmed a similar General Assembly resolution of
1969 (2574 D XXIV) and called upon all states "to cease and desist from all
activities aiming at commercial exploitation in the sea-bed area and to refrain
from engaging directly or through their nationals in any operations aimed at the
"'Supra, note 49 at 173.
""'The area shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes without prejudice to any measures
which have been or may be agreed upon in the context of international negotiations undertaken in
the field of disarmament and which may be applicable to a broader area. One or more international
agreements shall be concluded as soon as possible in order to implement effectively this principle
and to constitute a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof
from the arms race." Supra, note 63.
."'U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/L. l1/Rev. 1 (1972); also found in the Report of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 1972,
27th Sess., Supp. no. 21 (A/8721) at 69.
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exploitation of the area before the establishment of the international
regime." 1 3 This was obviously another effort to restrict the freedom and
advantage of the technologically advanced states and to preserve the rights and
potential benefits of the developing countries.
Prospects
As the previous paragraphs reveal, the Chinese have devoted much less
attention to the regulation of the sea-bed than to other areas of the law of the
sea. This is doubtless due to the fact that the issues involved are less pressing
than such needs as coastal security, the preservation of exclusive fisheries and
the exploitation of continental shelf resources. But the Chinese certainly
recognize the long term importance of the regime that will be adopted to dispose
of the great wealth of the ocean bottom. And they can be expected to give
greater time and effort to this matter.
Concluding Note
In order to understand the motivation and direction of Chinese policy on the
law of the sea, it is necessary to examine the various roles played by the Chinese
Government in the international arena, each of which is an element in the
formulation of its overall attitude.
Third World Leadership
By far the most important factor to be considered is the desire of the Chinese
Government to lead the third world. The Chinese make every effort to identify
themselves with the developing countries and to stress their common historical
and contemporary situation.124 They of course give unstinting support to the
desires voiced by these weak and poor states for broadened territorial seas and
areas of exclusive maritime jurisdiction. 12 s Coupled with this are bitter attacks
23Cohen, Chinese Attitudes Toward InternationalLaw-And Our Own, PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L.
L., April 27-29, 1967 at 116.
2
'As An Chih-yuan stressed in his speech to the Sea-Bed Committee on March 3, 1972, "China
shared the common lot and faces the common historical tasks as the great m? rity of the countries
of Asia, Africa and Latin America." Supra, note 3.
""'The Chinese people regard the struggle of the Latin American countries and people against
U.S. imperialist aggression as their own struggle. They express firm support for the Latin American
countries and people in their struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression and in defense of the rights
of territorial seas." "Support Latin American Countries Struggling to Defend Their Territorial Sea
Right," J.MJ.P. (Nov. 20, 1970) in CHAI, n. 108, supra, at 207. "China firmly supported the just
struggle undertaken by the Latin American countries in defense of the 200-mile limit of their
territorial waters and their own marine resources and resolutely opposed the maritime hegemony
and power politics of the Super-Powers." Supra, note 3. "We will, as always, firmly stand by the
developing countries and all the justice upholding countries to work for a fair and reasonable
settlement of the question of the rights over the seas and oceans." Supra. notel2. See also "Peruvian
Minister of Fisheries Visits China," 14 P.R. 26:4 (June 25, 1971); "Joint Communique on
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and Peru," 14 P.R. 45:5 (Nov. 5, 1971);
"Diplomatic Relations Established between China and Argentina," 15 P.R. 7:26 (Feb. 25, 1972).
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on the Soviet Union and the United States which are pictured as the superpower
adversaries of the rest of the world trying to plunder the resources belonging to
other countries and to exploit a disproportionate share of the wealth owned in
common. Issues involved in the law of the sea have been an extremely useful
vehicle for Chinese political purposes. On most matters their interests are
congruent with those of the developing countries and they can comfortably and
consistently oppose the maritime powers which have very different needs,
objectives and capabilities.
Great Power Status
On the other hand, China is an aspiring great power with substantial military
and commercial potential on the seas. This sets it off from its third world
colleagues and creates the possibility of long term convergence of interests with
the superpowers it now so vigorously condemns. The Chinese Government must
therefore maintain a delicate balance between the immediate political
advantages it gains by siding with the underdeveloped countries and the future
opportunities it could enjoy as a maritime state. Thus, while the Chinese
denounce the superpowers for their abuses, they still give nominal support to
such principles as the freedom of the high seas which might eventually prove
useful.
Chinese Nationalism
Another factor that plays a part is the particularly Chinese element of the
complex. The present Government is the inheritor of a long social and political
history. Vivid in the mind if not the memory of the leaders and the people is the
proud tradition of the Middle Kingdom and the complete humiliation it
suffered at the hands of the Western powers and Japan. It is not difficult to
appreciate why they would oppose these states almost instinctively on any issue.
The problems relating to the sea provide still another opportunity for the
Chinese to give vent to their mistrust and antagonism. Their extreme suspicion
of the motives of others is an important characteristic that must be taken into
account.
Communism
Finally, and of least importance in the equation of Government policy, is the
fact that the Chinese claim to be a Communist society and to be the guardians of
Marxism-Leninism. However, little socialist philosophy is evident in their state-
ments and conduct.126 If there is an ideological component at all in the Chinese
position on law of the sea issues, it is the world view of the developing countries
'
2 Goldie, Rich and Poor Countries and the Limits of Ideology, 1 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L.
COMMERCE 92 (Oct. 1972) at 102.
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regardless of their particular mode of internal organization or international
alignment. Marxism-Leninism is used only as another club with which to beat
the Russians; it is not used as a guide for thought and action.
While the Chinese Government has articulated its views on a number of
subjects involving the oceans, its proposals as yet lack specificity. Chinese
attitudes and practices are still in the process of formation. The only certain
conclusion which can be made is that they can be expected to increase their
interest and involvement in this area of law and politics.
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